



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

of philosophy to the general social, economic, political, and scientific movements of the past. General ideas have too frequently been abstracted from their context and set up to form an independent and detached intellectual tradition. Such logic lifting with its criminal implications has been too often indulged in. Histories of philosophy have been too much histories of *abstract* ideas rather than accounts of the relation of *general* ideas to intellectual progress. For, after all, what the serious-minded student of history wants to know is what influence general ideas have had in the determination of human conduct. For back of statecraft and industries, back of institutions, manners, and creeds lie ideas. The justification of a study of the history of philosophy consists for the most part in the light that an analysis of general ideas throws on an interpretation and understanding of human behavior. In this respect Mr. Marvin has succeeded about as well as one can within the compass of a small volume. The closing pages in particular are noteworthy for the sketch they contain of the development of the ideas of toleration, liberalism, and social democracy.

M. T. McCLURE.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

*The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Research: The Gifford Lectures in the University of Aberdeen, 1912, 1913.* A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON, pp. 5-417, Clarendon Press.

*The Idea of God* by Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison is a scholarly addition to the series of lectures made possible by the generosity of Lord Gifford. Professor Pringle-Pattison's work is marked throughout by historical thoroughness, breadth of vision, and sincerity and consistency of purpose.

A brief summary of the main argument of the book—for it is an argument—will explain Professor Pringle-Pattison's position. Starting with Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* he finds that "the vague residuum of theistic belief which was all Hume considered deducible from the evidence" (p. 24) is significant indication of the tenacity with which man holds to some form of theism. As he passes from Hume to Kant, the author notices with approval Kant's very different method of approach as "not only sound in itself, but the fundamental contention of all idealistic philosophy since his time" (p. 24). Kant, as is well known, employed the idea of moral value to determine the idea of God. After Kant there arose a philosophical conflict, which Professor Pringle-Pattison calls the nineteenth century duel between idealism and naturalism. In this conflict Professor Pringle-Pattison sees on one side a tendency to set the principle of value in opposition to reason—to its own

destruction rather than reason's—and on the other side a tendency to substitute for scientific theory a fragmentary and partial scientific truth, which becomes, he says, a "scientific incubus." It is largely due to the development of biological science that we have been freed within the last generation from this "bad dream of Naturalism" (p. 66), which he further defines as "the type of theory which so emphasizes the continuity between man and the non-human nature from which he springs as to minimize, if not entirely to deny, any difference between them. It denies at any rate any central significance to human life in the play of cosmic forces. Consciousness is an incident or accident of the universe, which does not throw any special illumination upon its ultimate nature. It arises and passes away: the physical basis of things remains. Naturalism is, in short, a larger, and in some respects a looser, term for what used to be called Materialism" (p. 89).

Under the liberating influence of modern biological thought, we come to a fundamental conception foreign to the older Naturalism, the conception of "*continuity of process and the emergence of real differences*" (p. 103). From this principle it follows that man may be said to be organic to the world. Moreover, Professor Pringle-Pattison insists that in man's experience the true nature of his world reveals itself to him. He says: "I attempted to show the inherent absurdity of the position that, because knowledge is the result of a process, the truth of the report is thereby invalidated. . . . The thing as it is and the thing as it appears are in principle the same fact differently named, because looked at in different aspects" (p. 132).

This principle of man's physical and cognitive relation to the world must be extended, Professor Pringle-Pattison believes, to include his moral nature. There is not, for example, the cleavage between man as moral and nature as non-moral which is a supposition underlying the "Religion of Humanity" proposed by Comte. The author feels that it is a misleading dualism, inherited from Kant, to hold that: "Nature and man are not part of one scheme of things: Nature is just, as it were, a brute fact with which man finds himself confronted" (p. 153).

This dualism is not less pernicious, in his opinion, when stated in terms of Agnosticism: that one member of the dualism is a blank abstraction, to which "no attributes can be ascribed." Furthermore the attempt of Panpsychism to render the terms of the dualism less hostile "by resolving external nature into an aggregate of tiny minds, or still worse, of 'small pieces of mind stuff'" (p. 188) gains nothing and introduces much confusion.

The monism which he establishes takes this form: "Nature as a

whole should be recognized as complementary to mind, and possessing, therefore, no absolute existence of its own apart from its spiritual completion; just as mind in turn would be intellectually and ethically void without a world to furnish it with the materials of knowledge and duty. Both are necessary elements of a single system" (p. 189).

This idealistic position he is at pains to distinguish from Berkeley's position, which he calls "mentalism." "God as immanent—the divine as revealed in the structure and system of finite experience," this, he says is the text and outcome of the argument thus far (p. 215).

He thus allies himself admittedly with "absolutist" writers like Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet, although he finds Mr. Bradley's method of procedure unfortunate (p. 226), however generally sound his conclusions. He agrees with Professor Bosanquet that we reach the Absolute, not from the bare idea of a systematic whole, but by inference from experience, and by taking, as he says, quoting Professor Bosanquet directly, "the general direction of our higher experiences as a clue to the direction in which perfection has to be sought" (p. 232).

In speaking of the nature of our assurance of this position about ultimate reality, Professor Pringle-Pattison makes two very significant admissions. He says that "if we ask what is the nature of our certainty that existence, the world of facts, is ultimately and throughout intellectually coherent . . . we are bound to reply that in a sense it is an unproved belief" (p. 239). He says this postulate of reason may be regarded as a "venture of faith." But, and this is the second significant admission, he holds that faith is the confidence "that thought, when consistent with itself, is true, that necessary implication in thought expresses a necessary implication in reality" (p. 240). This he thinks is the presupposition of all thinking.

The remaining seven chapters do not further advance the main argument, although they add greatly to the completeness with which the thesis of the immanence of God in the world is presented. "The infinite in and through the finite, the finite in and through the infinite—this mutual implication is the ultimate fact of the universe as we know it. It is the Eternal fashion of the Cosmic Life" (p. 315).

This is a theme which will attract many readers, and it is safe to predict for the book a wide public, since it has in addition the attraction of literary charm, and a manner at once scholarly and clear. It is one of the few books in philosophy which will hold both laymen and professional students.

It presents, however, certain aspects which can not be allowed

to pass unchallenged, especially since the author insists in the preface that its chief interest is "neither critical nor historical, but constructive throughout" (p. vii), although to the general reader, as to the present one, its value may seem to lie in its critical and historical undertaking rather than in its constructive phase.

The author has neglected to consider an alternative interpretation to the immanent purposiveness of reality, one suggested by a school of philosophers whom he rather summarily dismisses (pp. 22, 288). Starting from the biological principle which Professor Pringle-Pattison himself finds so important, namely, the conception of "*continuity of process and emergence of real differences*," in the course of the development of life, we do arrive, as he says, at a conception of man as organic to the world. What this organic relation is, I believe Professor Pringle-Pattison essentially misconceives. Granted, as he figuratively says, that "Mind is set in the heart of the world," what does it then mean to say that "it is itself the center in which the essential nature of the whole reveals itself"?

To be concrete, we may think that the woodland path which is guiding a hunter's course is "mind" in the sense that it has meaning for the hunter and demands from him a certain form of behavior. In like manner, to proceed in Professor Pringle-Pattison's method, we can extend the organic relation of man to his world and find in the "heart of the world" moral values, for particular situations call for choice in terms of better and worse, and thus indicate the organic moral relation of man to his environment.

What Professor Pringle-Pattison fails to see is that in these relationships the rôles of man and of nature are not identical. Nature, or the world, is the instrument through which man knows, and through which he chooses, but this relationship is not reversible. *Nature never knows through man, nor chooses through him*, which is the assumed formula of the purposive immanence which Professor Pringle-Pattison finds. It is this erroneously conceived relationship which he elevates to the position of Deity, and it is that clue that he is following in his search for the Absolute, even while he believes he is following an empirical method.

In explaining the nature of the Absolute, Professor Pringle-Pattison fails signally to satisfy the unescapable questions connected with time, truth and freedom. In regard to the absolute experience of time, his best answer in reply to critics of Absolutism like Professor McGilvary is a faulty analogy. "A parent can sympathize with the ephemeral joys and unreasoning sorrows of his child. May we not extend the analogy" (p. 365)? Moreover, his treatment of time makes succession a defect (p. 355) and time itself mere illusion (p. 366).

The relation of the Absolute and truth is no more satisfactory. Truth appears as timeless (p. 347) and as the Whole (pp. 97, 106-7, 109, 154-6, 177, 215, 331-2, 362), and therefore as the ultimately unintelligible.

In regard to freedom, what, finally, are we to think of the value of the idea of the indwelling of God in man (p. 410) and of God as the very texture of our human experience (p. 419)? Does it add to the worth, or to the truth, or even to the beauty of our idea of the human self to think that the individual self is the organ, or instrument, of the Absolute (p. 258)? Again we must remember that the alternative to this inverted instrumentality is to conceive of man as a conscious agent laboring to bring to pass in and through the world the possibilities which shine upon the forehead of that world.

ETHEL E. SABIN

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

*Human Immortality and Pre-existence.* J. M. E. M'TAGGART. New York: Longmans, Green & Company. 1915. Pp. 119.

The two essays comprising this little volume were reprinted in 1915 with slight changes from the author's *Some Dogmas of Religion*. It is evident that the author's belief in the practical concern of the question of immortality at the present time led him to reprint these essays separately. The essay on Immortality offers no positive arguments, but endeavors to remove some of the objections "against immortality which have been based on certain facts of ordinary observation, and on certain results of physical science" (p. 10). The argument hinges upon, first, establishing the thesis of subjectivism, that what appears as matter and as my body "is only events in the life of some conscious being" (p. 50). And, secondly, there is a re-statement of the Platonic argument that the Self as conscious is no sum of parts, no composition, and hence can not disintegrate, and there is no analogy anywhere which might lead us to suppose that it becomes simply annihilated. The bulk of the second essay is devoted to the argument that the lack of memory from one life to another is no serious barrier to supposing that individual selves are immortal throughout a series of lives, and that such failure to remember our previous existence in no way impairs the value of preexistence and immortality.

To the present reviewer, the substance of these essays appears singularly removed from the temper and requirements of the world we live in now. I say nothing of the way in which untempered subjectivism leaves most of us quite indifferent. Our world is most concerned with the life and the fate of communities, of nations, and of